General existence of competitive equilibrium in the growth model with an endogenous labor–leisure choice

We prove the existence of competitive equilibrium in the canonical optimal growth model with elastic labor supply under general conditions. In this model, strong conditions to rule out corner solutions are often not well justified. We show using a separation argument that there exist Lagrange multipliers that can be viewed as a system of competitive prices. Neither Inada conditions, nor strict concavity, nor homogeneity, nor differentiability are required for existence of a competitive equilibrium. Thus, we cover important specifications used in the macroeconomics literature for which existence of a competitive equilibrium is not well understood. We give examples to illustrate the violation of the conditions used in earlier existence results but where a competitive equilibrium can be shown to exist following the approach in this paper.     

住房自有率与城市蔓延：理论与实证

通过构建一个包含住房租赁市场的封闭、单中心城市一般均衡模型，模型化了住房自有率与城市蔓延之间的关系，理论模型结论显示：首先，与自有住房者相比，租房者倾向于居住在离市中心较近的地方；其次，住房自有率的提高会使城市空间面积扩大，加剧城市蔓延。进一步，利用地级市数据分别对理论命题结论进行了检验，在比较充分地控制内生性问题后，实证结果证实了高住房自有率会加剧城市蔓延。因此，长期以来我国不断升高的住房自有率也是加剧我国城市蔓延的重要原因。     

Fallback Bargaining

Under fallback bargaining, bargainers begin by indicating their preference rankings over alternatives. They then fall back, in lockstep, to less and less preferred alternatives – starting with first choices, then adding second choices, and so on – until an alternative is found on which all bargainers agree. This common agreement, which becomes the outcome of the procedure, may be different if a decision rule other than unanimity is used. The outcome is always Pareto-optimal but need not be unique; if unanimity is used, it is at least middling in everybody's ranking. Fallback bargaining may not select a Condorcet alternative, or even the first choice of a majority of bargainers. However, it does maximize bargainers' minimum satisfaction. When bargainers are allowed to indicate impasse in their rankings – below which they would not descend because they prefer no agreement to any lower-level alternative – then impasse itself may become the outcome, foreclosing any agreement. The vulnerability of fallback bargaining to manipulation is analyzed in terms of both best responses and Nash equilibria. Although a bargainer can sometimes achieve a preferred outcome through an untruthful announcement, the risk of a mutually worst outcome in a Chicken-type game may well deter the bargainers from attempting to be exploitative, especially when information is incomplete. Fallback bargaining seems useful as a practicable procedure if a set of reasonable alternatives can be generated. It leapfrogs the give-and-take of conventional bargaining, which often bogs down in details, by finding a suitable settlement through the simultaneous consideration of all alternatives.     

论风景名胜区特许经营合同

风景名胜区特许经营合同属于行政合同，首先具有公法性，同时也兼具私法的特征，公法原理和部分私法原理均是其存在的法理基础。风景名胜区特许经营合同的基本内容必须体现它的法律性质，在强调公共利益至上的基础上，将公共利益与被特许人追求经济利益的权利相统一，依据经济利益平衡原则来确定合同双方的权利和义务。     

国际资本流动对我国就业影响的均衡分析

文章通过建立一个劳动力市场与资本市场的均衡模型,对国际资本不流动与国际资本不完全自由流动两种情况下的分析表明,国际资本流动加剧了国内劳动力市场的就业风险,并且国际资本流动对就业水平影响与本国资本市场的开放度有关,增加开放度有利于提高本国的就业水平.我国应在采取有效措施减小国内劳动者就业波动的同时,逐渐提高资本市场的开放度.     

重构比较优势理论的微观基础:一般均衡分析

基于消费者与厂商的最优决策,通过将外生技术差别纳入H-O模型进行一般均衡分析,重构比较优势理论的微观基础。研究发现,国际分工取决于要素禀赋与技术差别两种因素的综合作用,劳动力相对丰裕的国家若生产资本密集型商品的技术优势超过禀赋劣势,反而可以出口资本密集型商品。为了避免陷入"比较利益陷阱",中国应采取有效措施加快技术进步,突破传统比较优势分工格局。     

对中小企业技术创新项目风险投资的博弈分析

在中小企业对技术创新项目进行融资的过程中,风险投资是其融资的一个重要途径,而风险投资人与风险企业之间会因利益的分配展开博弈。通过建立风险投资人与风险企业之间的博弈模型,可以看出风险企业对利润率高的技术创新项目进行风险融资的可行性并不高,所以风险投资人应谨慎选择风险企业进行投资,以降低资金风险。     

中国—东盟关税同盟区的贸易效应分析

东盟的未来取决于和中国经济一体化的程度,这是一个不争的事实。本文通过一般均衡分析模型、贸易创造和贸易转移模型、竞争效应模型、规模经济效应模型对中国东盟关税同盟区的贸易效应进行了前瞻性的分析和探索,旨在为加深中国东盟经济一体化进程提供理论上的支持。     

论政府规制均衡及均衡的动态调整

现实经济已经证明 ,市场竞争与政府规制的有机动态结合是实现资源最优配置和社会福利最大化的手段与途径 ,而此种结合所形成的乃是政府规制的目标———政府规制均衡。本文在对政府规制进行成本—收益分析和供给—需求分析的基础上 ,分析了政府规制的静态均衡 ;同时分析了政府规制均衡的动态调整过程 ,为进一步分析政府规制的效果与目标的实现程度提供了一个理论分析框架。     

DZ-1A重整预加氢催化剂的长周期工业应用

DZ-1A催化剂开车一次成功,8个月以后进行了标定,结果表明,该催化剂的加氢油各项指标达到了重整原料油要求.现在已经连续运转5α.该催化剂是一种性能优良、寿命较长的催化剂.